Planned Parenthood is asking the Supreme Court to place Texas' new abortion restrictions on hold.

The group says in a filing with the high court Monday that more than a third of the clinics in Texas have been forced to stop providing abortions since a court order allowed the new restrictions to take effect Friday.

Planned Parenthood says that the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals went too far in overruling a trial judge who blocked the law's provision that requires doctors who perform abortions in clinics to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.

The filing was addressed to Justice Antonin Scalia, who oversees emergency matters from Texas.

A state appeals court on Tuesday tossed out child abuse findings against a frustrated Northern California mother who spanked her 12-year-old daughter hard enough with a wooden spoon to cause bruising.

The 6th District Court of Appeal in San Jose reversed the child abuse determination made by the Santa Clara County Department of Social Services. Social workers waned to report Vernica Gonzalez to the state Department of Justice's child abuse database with a "substantiated" abuse determination. That determination was upheld by a trial court judge.

The appeals court said the spanking came close to abuse, but that social workers and the lower court judge failed to consider the family's entire circumstances.

Gonzalez and her husband testified that other forms of punishment such as groundings and taking away her phone had failed to persuade their 12-year-old daughter to do her schoolwork and avoid gang culture. The parents said that other family members had testified that spankings in the household were a rarity.

The appeals court said the mother's growing frustration with her daughter's behavior and her intention not to inflict harm in the April 2010 spanking weighed heavily in its ruling.

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. says it will comply with a judge's order and shut down a natural gas pipeline after safety issues were raised.

The utility said Sunday it believes the pipeline is safe despite an engineer's email questioning the safety of the 83-year-old line's welds. PG&E said it could take until Tuesday to safely shut down the line and seamlessly switch its customers to another line.

A judge ordered the line shut down after San Carlos city officials discovered the email and declared a "state of emergency."

The email said PG&E's records incorrectly show the line containing a newer, more reliable weld than it actually has.

PG&E said state-of-the-art tests show the line is safe and that it was shutting the line only because of the court order.

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP today announced that a class action has been commenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of CNOOC Limited American Depositary Shares (“ADSs”) during the period between January 27, 2011 and September 16, 2011.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than 60 days from today. If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff’s counsel, Darren Robbins of Robbins Geller at 800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at djr@rgrdlaw.com. If you are a member of this class, you can view a copy of the complaint as filed or join this class action online at http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/cnooc/. Any member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

The complaint charges CNOOC and certain of its officers and directors with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. CNOOC is China’s biggest offshore state oil company. CNOOC co-owns the Penglai 19-3 (“PL 19-3”) oilfield in northern Bohai Bay with ConocoPhillips China Inc. (“ConocoPhillips”) as its operator.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants issued materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business and financial results. As a result of defendants’ false statements, CNOOC’s ADSs traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period, reaching a high of US$270.64 per ADS on April 4, 2011.

On June 4, 2011, an oil spill occurred at the PL 19-3 oilfield. A second spill occurred at the PL 19-3 oilfield on June 17, 2011. The complaint alleges that CNOOC and ConocoPhillips failed to disclose the spills when they occurred. However, despite CNOOC’s attempts to conceal the news, news of the spills began to leak into the market. On July 5, 2011, the State Oceanic Administration (“SOA”), China’s coastal regulator, officially acknowledged the spills had occurred. Thereafter, CNOOC downplayed the extent of the damage done by the oil spills and the impact it would have on CNOOC’s operations. On September 2, 2011, the SOA announced that it had ordered CNOOC and ConocoPhillips to immediately suspend all oil production at the PL 19-3 oilfield. On September 6, 2011, it was announced that CNOOC and ConocoPhillips would establish a Bohai Bay fund to address the environmental impact of the oil spills. On this news, CNOOC’s ADSs declined US$9.39 per ADS on September 6, 2011. Then, on September 18, 2011, it was announced that CNOOC and ConocoPhillips would establish a second Bohai Bay fund. On this news, CNOOC’s ADSs declined another US$6.85 per ADS on September 19, 2011.

According to the complaint, the true facts, which were known by the defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, were as follows: (a) the Company was not in compliance with environmental laws and regulations; (b) as news of the oil spills emerged, the Company concealed the extent and severity of the oil spills; (c) as news of the oil spills emerged, the Company downplayed its responsibility to effect the cleanup of the oil spills as it portrayed itself as being the “non-operator” of the oilfield; (d) the Company improperly accounted for its contingent liabilities in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles; and (e) based on the foregoing, defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their positive statements about the Company’s operations and its expected oil production.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of CNOOC ADSs during the Class Period (the “Class”). The plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has expertise in prosecuting investor class actions and extensive experience in actions involving financial fraud.

www.rgrdlaw.com

The Indiana Court of Appeals has issued a decision that may have a large impact on summary judgment practice in Indiana. In Commr. of the Indiana Dept. of Ins. v. Black, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), the Court essentially held that Indiana will apply the standard set forth in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), at least in some circumstances.

Tim Black alleged that Dr. Harris and others rendered negligent care to his wife after she complained of chest pain. The negligence allegedly resulted in severe cardiac arrest and resulted in the need for a heart transplant. The medical review panel unanimously concluded that Dr. Harris failed to comply with the applicable standard of care.

After the panel decision, Black filed a petition seeking payment of $1 million from the Patient's Compensation Fund and asserted that he had settled with Dr. Harris for $250,000, thereby satisfying the qualifying amount to get to the fund. The Commissioner sought discovery of the settlement agreement but Black refused to produce it, saying it was confidential. Black did produce a copy of an unauthenticated check in the amount $250,000 from the Medical Assurance Co., made payable to Black and his counsel. Black also produced some correspondence between counsel that discussed a prospective settlement.

The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition claiming that he needed the settlement agreement in order to make payment. It was not clear from the check whether the payment was for settlement with Dr. Harris or other defendants. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and after conducting a hearing on damages, ordered the Commissioner to pay Black $1 million. The Commissioner appealed.

In considering the motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals observed that matters outside the pleadings were submitted in support of the motion to dismiss and were relied on by the trial court. In light of this fact, the Court of Appeals, pursuant to T.R. 12(B), treated the motion as one for summary judgment. In a footnote, the court recognized that T.R. 12(B) requires that "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56." Although no such "opportunity" was given, the court found there was "no prejudice" and proceeded to consider the appeal as a summary judgment case.

The court noted that the Commissioner's position on the motion required him to prove a negative?-that there was no settlement with Harris for $250,000. In Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 1994), the Indiana Supreme Court rejected the view that a party seeking summary judgment could simply point to the opponent’s burden of proof at trial and prevail unless the non-movant produced evidence supporting its claim or defense. This ruling has for many years been perceived as being at odds with Celotex, in which the U.S. Supreme Court reached a different conclusion under the federal rules. In 2000, Justice Boehm, in dissenting from a denial of transfer in Lenhart Tool & Die, Inc. v. Lumpe, 722 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 2000), expressed the view that a party who puts forward evidence that a non-movant will be unable to present evidence to prove an essential element of its claim or defense, should be entitled to summary judgment if the non-movant fails to present such evidence. In Black, the Court of Appeals held: "Today, we accept Justice Boehm's views on this subject expressed in his dissent."

Having adopted this new standard, however, the Court of Appeals found that in this case, based on the unauthenticated check and the settlement correspondence, there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether a $250,000 settlement on Black’s claim against Harris had been accomplished. So, the Commissioner was not entitled to summary judgment. Black was also not entitled to a judgment on his claim since it was not clear that the required settlement with Harris for $250,000 had been consummated.

The Court held that the Commissioner is entitled to discovery of the settlement agreement and that the confidentiality term in the settlement agreement would not trump the Commissioner's right to such discovery. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.